**CP – Organized Crime**

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## ALTERNATE TEXT – CP

#### A is the text: The US CJS at the federal, state, and local level will implement a focused deterrence strategy for crime control. Implementation is through normal means, I reserve the right to clarify

Braga and Weisburd 2012 [Braga, Anthony A., and David L. Weisburg. 2012. Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime. No. 6 of Crime Prevention Research Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.] AJ

In closing, focused deterrence strategies are a recent addition to the existing scholarly ¶ literature on crime control and prevention strategies. While the evaluation evidence needs to ¶ be strengthened and the theoretical underpinnings of the approach need further refinement, ¶ jurisdictions suffering from gang violence, overt drug markets, and repeat offender problems ¶ should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing portfolio of prevention and control ¶ interventions. The existing evidence suggests that these new approaches to crime prevention ¶ and control generate noteworthy reductions in crime.

#### Brown 13 furthers:

Vanda Felbab-Brown February 2013. [“Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities” Modernising Drug Law Enforcement. International Drug Policy Consortium, Feb 2013] AT

To overcome the problems of resource intensity, dispersion of resources, and police abusiveness, law enforcement forces can adopt an alternative approach – namely, selectively focusing on punishing or incapacitating a chosen criminal group or a chosen type of offender either in a particular locale or the entire country with the goal of deterring other criminal groups or actors throughout the system from engaging in the designated harmful behaviour.7 In a similar vein, law enforcement can focus on hotspots of crime or chronic offenders.8 The underlying logic of these anti-crime focused deterrence strategies, increasingly popular in the United States and Western Europe, is that law enforcement interventions against a specifically selected type of offender or criminal group – whether by limited punishment or comprehensive incapacitation – will alter the behaviour of either the group itself or, if the group is altogether incapacitated, of other criminal groups and offenders in the system.9 How ‘the most pernicious’ group is defined or what is designated as ‘the most harmful’ behaviour to be deterred can vary. In the United States, where the focused deterrence strategies have been adopted, the groups or offenders selected for law enforcement actions have mostly been either highly-violent gangs or chronic or repeat offenders – the dominant goal being to reduce violence.10 However, one can designate other key objectives for focused-deterrence approaches. Instead of selecting the group with the greatest proclivity toward violence as the target for law enforcement action and punishment, the priority targets can be, for example, criminal groups most likely to cooperate with terrorist groups, and their engagement with terrorist groups can be announced as the basis for striking them.11 Other groups so selected might be criminal groups with greatest capacity to corrupt and capture the state’s institutions, or criminal groups participating in the most dangerous illicit economies such as nuclear smuggling.12 The broad concept, however, is to move law enforcement forces away from random nonstrategic – at times outright haphazard – strikes based merely on random intelligence flows, or from blanket ‘zero-tolerance’ approaches against lowest-level offenders, and toward strategic selectivity and to give each the counter-crime operation enhanced impact.

#### Your perms are outdated – the modern form of retributivism, called limiting retributivism, accepts deterrence as its justification.

Hudson 03. Barbara Hudson. Understanding Justice: An introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and Controversies in Modern Penal Theory. March 1, 2003. Open University Press. (Kindle Locations 846-854). Kindle Edition.

If asked `Why punishment and not compensation?', most retributivists would undoubtedly answer either that punishment is necessary to bring about remorse on the part of the offender (the communicative theory, which is really a form of moral rehabilitationism) or that punishment is more effective than compensation in deterring crime. Most contemporary retributivists readily admit that their principle is concerned with distribution rather than justification, and their limiting of their claims [claim] to retribution as [is] a rule for sentencing rather than for the existence of a system of punishments at all has become clearer as the new retributivism has been refined. Both von Hirsch and Duff, for example, separate the censure and hard treatment aspects of punishment, giving to censure the function of expressing the wrongness of the act, and to hard treatment that of providing a `prudential' reason for restraining from crime. The existence of a tariff of punishments will deter people from crime by telling them that it is wrong and that they will suffer unpleasant consequences if they commit it. Von Hirsch (1993: 13) sums up the two aspects of retributive punishment [are] thus: Persons are assumed to be moral agents, capable of taking seriously the message conveyed through the sanction, [and] that the conduct is reprehensible. They are fallible, nevertheless, and thus face temptation. The function of the disincentive is to provide a prudential reason for resisting the temptation. The account would¶ make no sense were human beings much better or worse: an angel would require no appeals to prudence, and a brute could not be appealed to through censure ... Von Hirsch agrees that the institution of punishment would/should be abolished if it were not necessary for the prevention of crime, so that his general justification is consequentialist and forward-looking. He insists, however, that `making prevention part of the justification for punishment's existence ... does not permit it to operate independently as a basis for deciding comparative punishments' (ibid.: 17).

## TEXT + COMPETITION

#### A is the text: The US Criminal Justice System at the federal, state, and local level will implement a focused deterrence strategy against high-level criminals in organized criminal groups, and will rehabilitate lower-level offenders with treatment and prosocial groups.

Corsaro and McGarrell. 2009. [An Evaluation of the Nashville Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Pulling Levers Strategy. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice.] AT

The use of a police crackdown in conjunction with the pulling levers strategy often serves as evidence of the seriousness and commitment by key criminal justice officials. From a theoretical perspective, pulling levers as an intervention strategy can be considered a focused deterrence approach based on the characteristics associated with offending and the criminal justice system response to offending. Since the strategy is both implemented and supported by a multi-agency working group there are a variety of sanctions available that can be used against offenders. Thus, the involvement of many agency members focused on a specific problem should increase the severity and certainty of penalties, leading to alterations in perceptions about sanctions and risk. Deterrence scholars discuss how offenders are constantly revising their perceptions of the risks and rewards of criminal behavior based on new information (Horney and Marshall, 1992; Nagin, 1998). The pulling levers meetings and an affirmative follow-up response are the types of new information that [which] may cause offenders to reassess the risks of committing gun crime. In addition to the deterrence component, the pulling levers strategy also includes the use of prosocial groups, such as community and church leaders as well as social service providers to provide offenders a variety of positive program and lifestyle alternatives in addition to the deterrent message. The use of positive social groups is designed to reduce defiance (Sherman, 1993) and make offenders aware that their former actions are the target of the task force, not themselves personally. In addition, Rosenfeld and Decker (1996) proposed that the reliance on community members in a strategic program sends a clear message that continued offending would not be tolerated when agents of the community are involved. Additionally, the[se] prosocial groups attempt to link participants to legitimate services (e.g., [such as] employment, housing, mentors, [and] drug treatment) and thus represent a form of social support (Cullen, 1994).

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Vanda Felbab-Brown February 2013. [“Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities” Modernising Drug Law Enforcement. International Drug Policy Consortium, Feb 2013] AT

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If asked `Why punishment and not compensation?', most retributivists would undoubtedly answer either that punishment is necessary to bring about remorse on the part of the offender (the communicative theory, which is really a form of moral rehabilitationism) or that punishment is more effective than compensation in deterring crime. Most contemporary retributivists readily admit that their principle is concerned with distribution rather than justification, and their limiting of their claims [claim] to retribution as [is] a rule for sentencing rather than for the existence of a system of punishments at all has become clearer as the new retributivism has been refined. Both von Hirsch and Duff, for example, separate the censure and hard treatment aspects of punishment, giving to censure the function of expressing the wrongness of the act, and to hard treatment that of providing a `prudential' reason for restraining from crime. The existence of a tariff of punishments will deter people from crime by telling them that it is wrong and that they will suffer unpleasant consequences if they commit it. Von Hirsch (1993: 13) sums up the two aspects of retributive punishment [are] thus: Persons are assumed to be moral agents, capable of taking seriously the message conveyed through the sanction, [and] that the conduct is reprehensible. They are fallible, nevertheless, and thus face temptation. The function of the disincentive is to provide a prudential reason for resisting the temptation. The account would¶ make no sense were human beings much better or worse: an angel would require no appeals to prudence, and a brute could not be appealed to through censure ... Von Hirsch agrees that the institution of punishment would/should be abolished if it were not necessary for the prevention of crime, so that his general justification is consequentialist and forward-looking. He insists, however, that `making prevention part of the justification for punishment's existence ... does not permit it to operate independently as a basis for deciding comparative punishments' (ibid.: 17).

## ADVANTAGE – DETERRENCE

### EMPIRICAL

#### This is empirically confirmed – focused deterrence reduces crime.

Braga and Weisburd 2012 [Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime. No. 6 of Crime Prevention Research Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.] AT

Nine of the 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations concluded that these programs generated significant crime control benefits (see Appendix B on page 31).4 A meta-analysis of these pulling levers strategies also found that these programs generated an overall statistically significant reduction in crime outcome measures (see Braga and Weisburd 2012).5 Although Boyle et al. (2010) reported a small but positive reduction in gunshot wound incidents from Newark’s Operation CeaseFire, this evaluation was the only one to not report any discernible crime prevention benefits generated by the violence reduction strategy.6 Evaluations of pulling levers strategies targeting gangs and criminally active groups reported large, statistically significant reductions in violent crime. These results included a 63 percent reduction in youth homicides in Boston (Braga et al. 2001), a 44 percent reduction in gun assault incidents in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008), a 42 percent reduction in gun homicides in Stockton, California (Braga 2008), a 35 percent reduction in homicides of criminally active group members in Cincinnati (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010), a 34 percent reduction in total homicides in [and] Indianapolis (McGarrell et al. 2006), and noteworthy short-term reductions in violent crime in Los Angeles (Tita et al. 2003)

#### Prefer because:

#### Their studies came from cities across the country, which eliminates the possibility of results being applicable to only a local area. Criminal justice backgrounds differ widely across the US so studies that aren’t tested across the US are useless for nation-wide action.

#### It is very selective of the data – it selected the only 10 studies yet published that had a rigorous enough methodology and were accurate evaluations of what the counterplan is – either your evidence is not about the CP or its methodology wasn’t good enough to be included in my study.

#### My evidence is the only one comparative between the counterplan and the aff – your evidence compares rehab to a lack of rehab, but the CP includes some rehabilitative services so your evidence is not comparative.

#### The CP uses a special form of deterrence so even if deterrence usually doesn’t work, that is not enough to prove that focused deterrence will not.

#### My evidence is the most recent, so it evaluates new strategies in gang violence rather than rely on conventional rehab wisdom from decades ago.

### CAUSALITY

#### A) Organized crime is best described by rational choice

Cornish and Clark 02 [Derek Cornish and Ronald Clark 2002. “Analyzing Organized Crimes” Ch3 of Rational Choice and Criminal Behavior: Recent Research and Future Challenges, 2002 Routledge Publishing] AT

In general terms, the rational choice perspective asserts that crime is chosen because of the beneﬁts it brings to the offender. On this analysis, the reasoning criminal, like other rational economic decision-makers (Becker 1968), considers the risks, effort, and rewards associated with alternative courses of action and selects the one which maximizes, or at least gives a reasonable return on, his or her investment of time and energy. It uses this general assumption both to explain why people become involved in particular forms of crime, and the conditions needed for speciﬁc crimes to take place (Clarke and Cornish 2000). There are a number of reasons for suggesting that the rational choice perspective might be particularly well suited to the analysis of organized crimes. The Purposive Nature of Organized Crimes [First,] Organized crimes are, of all offenses, the most readily seen as purposeful and instrumental—not least because their beneﬁts are the obvious ones of money or material goods, achieved through the careful and deliberate exploitation of opportunities for gain. In this sense, they come closest to representing the ideal type of crime for analysis in rational choice terms, and least like those sorts of crimes—spontaneous, ill-consid- ered, “senseless"—which, it is often claimed, the perspective cannot handle. Organized Crimes as Business Of all forms of crime, [Second] organized crimes most closely mirror the purposive economic activity of the non-criminal market-place. Although there are limits to its applicability, the analogy of crime as work (Lelttemann 1973) captures the instrumental nature of organized crimes. The rational choice approach sensitizes the researcher to examine organized crimes as the products of criminal business enterprises. If, as Levi comments, “. . . we need to examine crime as a business process, requiring funding, technical skills, distribution mechanisms, and money-handling facilities” (Levi 1998a, 343), then we need a suitable discourse within which to pur- sue our analysis. Organization and Planning The emphasis of the [Third] rational choice perspective on strategic thinking, [and] planning and sequential decision making may capture[s] important aspects of the successful undertaking of organized crimes. Such complex crimes involve the assembling of resources, the [which] coordinat[es]ion of efforts among self-interested and untrustworthy collaborators, the orderly and timely completion of contributory tasks, and the routiniz[es]ation of methods through constant refinement and repetition (see also Cusson 1993). Although such crimes are inevitably the product of imperfect rather than perfect rationality, they are—given the uncertain conditions under which they operate among the best examples of planned offending. The Diverse Nature of Organized Crimes As mentioned earlier, one of the limitations of the existing literature is its preoccupation with the social organization of offending, as evidenced in discussions of how organized crime should be defined and described (Reuter 1983). This debate often takes place at the expense of paying due attention to the range of phenomena that the term encompasses. The rational choice perspective, on the other hand, starts from the position that organized crime may be better under- stood—and certainly better controlled—through the under- taking of crime-speciﬁc studies into its constituent phenome- na and the determinants (including organizational ones) of their successful undertaking.

#### B) Generic blocks don’t apply – organized crime fits the rational choice approach even if it doesn’t work for most crimes.

Cornish 2:

The rational choice approach to offending assumes that when criminals offend they do so because crime provides the most effective means of achieving desired beneﬁts (Clarke and Cornish 1985, 2000; Cornish and Clarke I986). Similarly, the choice of methods for carrying out the crime, and the decision-making involved, are also best regarded as instrumental behaviors in the service of offenders’ goals. Not surprisingly, the usual criticism of this perspective is precisely that, in general, it imputes too much deliberation, forethought, and planning and too little pathology and impulsivity to offenders’ behaviors; and that, in particular, it provides little help in understanding or preventing the so-called “expressive” crimes of sex and violence. Whatever the merits of [but] these criticisms for other offenses (see, for example, Tedeschi and Felson 1994, in relation to violent crime) they carry little weight in respect of organized crime. This is rational crime par excellence: it [since it] is highly planned [and] and organized, directed and committed by older, more determined offenders, usually with strong economic motivations. But although the impetus behind organized crime is an economic one, the principal contribution of the rational choice perspective is not so much to provide an answer to the question of “why” such criminal activities occur, but rather to address the question of “how” they are carried out. It is only by being in a position to answer[s] questions about the process of crime commission [so] that policy responses, particularly preventive [policy responses] ones, can be developed. This chapter outlines a conceptual framework and some associated research strategies designed to develop better ways of addressing such “how” questions for policy purposes. In particular, it proposes that detailed descriptions, or “crime scripts,“ of the modi operandi of organized crimes need to be developed at an appropriately crime-speciﬁc level of analysis. It goes on to suggest how such an approach might contribute to the theory and practice of preventing organized crimes.

#### Therefore, focused deterrence is key to reducing crime by deterrence.

Braga and Weisburd 2012 [Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime. No. 6 of Crime Prevention Research Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.] AT

The pulling levers focused deterrence strategies designed to reduce violence by gangs and criminally active street groups generally replicate the Operation Ceasefire process developed in Boston during the 1990s (Braga et al. 2001). Briefly, the Boston Operation Ceasefire program was designed to prevent violence by reaching out directly to gangs, explicitly saying that violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when violence occurred (Kennedy 1997). The chronic involvement of gang members in a wide variety of offenses made them, and the gangs they formed, vulnerable to a coordinated criminal justice response. As such, the authorities could: Disrupt street drug activity Focus police attention on low-level street crimes, such as trespassing and public drinking Serve outstanding warrants Cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities Deliver strict probation and parole enforcement Seize drug proceeds and other assets Ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention Request (and enforce) stronger bail terms [by] Bring[ing] potentially severe federal investigative and prosecutorial attention to gang-related drug and gun activity Simultaneously, youth workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups [also could] offered gang members services and other kinds of help. The Boston Ceasefire working group, consisting of criminal justice, social service, and community-based partners, also delivered an explicit message that violence was unacceptable to the community and that “street” justifications for violence were mistaken. The Boston Ceasefire working group delivered this message in formal meetings (i.e., forums or call-ins) with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, in meetings with inmates at secure juvenile facilities in the city, and through gang outreach workers. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response from law enforcement. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, then the normal workings of the police, the prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters. But if gang members hurt people, the Boston Ceasefire working group concentrated its enforcement actions on those gangs. DMI strategies seek to shut down overt drug markets entirely (Kennedy 2009). Enforcement powers are used strategically and sparingly, employing arrest and prosecution only against violent offenders and when nonviolent offenders have resisted all efforts to desist and receive help. Through the use of “banked” cases,3 [so] the strategy makes the promise of law enforcement sanctions against dealers direct and credible, so that dealers have no doubt concerning the consequences of offending and have good reason to change their behavior. The strategy also brings powerful informal social control to bear on dealers from immediate family and community figures. It organizes and focuses services, help, and support on dealers so that those who are willing have what they need to change their lives. Each operation also includes a maintenance strategy.

#### Weighing:

#### This means rehab can’t work since it can only target social or psychological factors. If crime is a result of rational choice, then rehab cannot target the causes of crime since it does not provide rational disincentives, only attempts to cure irrational ones which don’t exist.

#### I access causality since my arguments are based in the incentives that lead to crime – the AC can’t solve for these issues so their solvency is limited to the short-term and only to certain sections of the population.

### WEIGHING

#### Focused deterrence outweighs the AC recidivism impacts:

#### Organized criminal groups, such as gangs, are responsible for the most violent of crimes.

National Institute of Justice 11 [National Institute of Justice. 2011 [“Gangs and Gang Crime” Office of Justice Programs, October 28, 2011] AT

* 1. Gang members engage in a higher level of serious and violent crime than their non-gang-involved peers. Research about gangs is often intertwined with research about gun violence and drug crime. It is clear that gangs, guns, drugs and violence are interconnected.[1] When communities assess their gun violence problem, they often uncover a gang violence problem. Communities that recognize the unique challenges associated with reducing gangs and related crime problems, such as gun violence, become safer and healthier, and may be more resilient to future crime threats.

#### **Even if the CP has a smaller link you still prefer it since I access the biggest impacts.**

#### Deterrence prevents the cycle of crime before it starts, whereas rehabilitation only stops recidivism after one crime has been committed. This means the effect of deterrence is always greater than rehab since only deterrence can prevent first offenses.

#### Not everyone recidivates, so preventing first offenses is more important than recidivism because there are fewer recidivists than there are first offenders.

#### Evolution dictates that it’s basic human nature to minimize one’s own pain – it’s endemic to everyone. This means deterrence can deter everyone, whereas different people have different personalities, making rehabilitation ineffective for some people.

#### *And, rehab generally fails:*

#### *Rehab isn’t severe enough so organized crime leaders, who are the most dangerous criminals, would be released quickly and return to crime. Reducing the risk of crime requires incapacitating them, since it has a much higher certainty of preventing them from returning to crime than rehab does.*

#### *Abandoning harsh policies for those who are in gangs means they will just be replaced because there are other people who could step in, and they have no disincentive because the punishment is not harsh, so rehabilitation cannot tackle organized crime. Rehabilitation cannot get rid of criminogenic communal factors since it only targets one criminal after they have committed crime. Only retribution deters people from stepping in and effectively destroys criminal groups.*

## ADVANTAGE – DRUGS

#### Rehabilitating dealers and higher-up criminals does not work. Only a strategy of rehabilitating lower-level criminals and incapacitating chronic offenders can prevent both replacement of dealers and the recidivism of chronic dealers after prison.

Corsaro and McGarrell. 2009. [An Evaluation of the Nashville Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Pulling Levers Strategy. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice.] AT

Open-air drug dealing is associated with high levels of crime and disorder and quality of community life. For years police and local residents in many communities have witnessed a cycle whereby drug dealers are arrested only to be replaced by another group of individuals drawn to the lure of the illegal drug economy. The DMI represents an innovative, community policing and problem solving effort to break this cycle and significantly reduce or eliminate the open-air drug market. Chronic and violent drug sellers are prosecuted but less serious offenders, those likely to serve as replacements in the drug market, are provided the opportunity to avoid prosecution as well as social support to pursue legitimate opportunities outside the illegal economy.

#### B) Focused deterrence interventions empirically work.

Corsaro and McGarrell 2:

The results from this evaluation indicate that criminal offenses, drug offenses, and calls for police service in the McFerrin Park and adjoining neighborhoods experienced a statistically significant and substantive decline following the March 2008 DMI [Drug Market Intervention] pulling levers strategy. Controlling for seasonal effects, we found that property offenses declined in McFerrin Park by roughly 2.5 total offenses per month after the Nashville DMI campaign was implemented. 2 Similarly, narcotics offenses experienced a reduction of nearly 55.5 percent and drug equipment violations decreased by 36.8 percent after the intervention was implemented. Calls for service requesting officer assistance declined by 18.1 percent per month in the same area. This statistical analysis also indicated that the change in crime rates was sustained, at least from a 12 month post-intervention analysis. Similar reductions were experienced in the adjoining neighborhood, which indicated that a diffusion of benefits was observed in the contiguous neighborhoods. That is, [and] there was no evidence of a displacement or shift of drug offending to the nearby neighborhood but rather a reduction in crime rates that mirrored the one experienced in the target community. Finally, the remainder of Nashville did not experience a similar reduction in these outcome variables as was seen in the target and adjacent areas, which indicates there was not a general trend that would likely have influenced this observed shift in crime and calls for service rates in McFerrin Park. Thus, we conclude that the substantive, significant, and sustained reduction in crime and related nuisances coincided with the Nashville DMI campaign.

#### Prefer because:

#### They used control groups within the same area so their study checks the possibility of skews across the country. Studies that don’t do this fail because the country uses widely different CJS policies so the difference may not be due to treatment effectiveness, but because of interstate differences in other parts of the CJS.

#### Their study is specific to focused deterrence interventions so it is the only evidence that is comparative to the CP – aff evidence will only reference deterrence, but that’s not my advocacy.

### IMPACT + WEIGHING

#### My impact outweighs the aff:

#### First, solvency deficit – treatment programs fail since the only limit on drug use is availability.

Loken and Kennedy 90 [Gregory A. Loken and James Kennedy 1990 [senior staff attorney and executive director of the Institute for Youth Advocacy and Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University of Bridgeport School of Law. , Medical Director of Covenant House New York, an Associate Professor of Clinical Medicine at the New York University School of Medicine “LEGAL COCAINE AND KIDS: THE VERY BITTERNESS OF SHAME” 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 567 1989-1990]

Both experimental and clinical evidence strongly suggest that availability is, for many consumers, the only limit on cocaine's use. In studies with laboratory animals, including monkeys, cocaine's reinforcing qualities and dependence potential have been such that, "where there are no outside [without] restraints on drug availability, animals can suddenly increase their drug-taking behavior to the point of severe toxicity. In contrast, the intake of cocaine under other conditions (i.e., limited access) is surprisingly regulated."165 Clinical studies of humans indicate the same fact: "[that] When drug access is unlimited, [drugs] cocaine and amphetamine have the same ability to dominate behavior, reducing other behaviors such as feeding and sleeping and, in the process, reduc[e]ing stress resistance to life-threatening levels."1'66 It is, therefore, the consistent opinion of medical professionals that limited access plays a crucial role in preventing self-immolation through endless binging.1' 7 In a large survey of adolescent cocaine users, "[n]early all the subjects [Cocaine users] said that the only limit on their cocaine use was money: [i]f they had more money, they would use more cocaine."'1 68

#### It is impossible to arrest every drug user because that is not financially possible, and because many users don’t possess enough drugs at once to be arrested. Solvency deficit for the aff – they cannot solve the majority of drug use, so even if they win all of their solvency it still isn’t enough.

#### Second, illicit drug use causes thousands of deaths – solving for crime in general won’t prevent as much deaths.

Mokdad et al 04 [Ali H. Mokdad, PhD; James S. Marks, MD, MPH; Donna F. Stroup, PhD, MSc; Julie L. Gerberding “Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000” Journal of the American Medical Association, March 10, 2004] AT

Design Comprehensive MEDLINE search of English-language articles that identified epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory studies linking risk behaviors and mortality. The search was initially restricted to articles published during or after 1990, but we later included relevant articles published in 1980 to December 31, 2002. Prevalence and relative risk were identified during the literature search. We used 2000 [and] mortality data reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to identify the causes and number of deaths. The estimates of cause of death were computed by multiplying estimates of the cause-attributable fraction of preventable deaths with the total mortality data. Main Outcome Measures Actual causes of death. Results The leading causes of death in 2000 were tobacco (435 000 deaths; 18.1% of total US deaths), poor diet and physical inactivity (400 000 deaths; 16.6%), and alcohol consumption (85 000 deaths; 3.5%). Other actual causes of death were microbial agents (75 000), toxic agents (55 000), motor vehicle crashes (43 000), incidents involving firearms (29 000), sexual behaviors (20 000), and illicit use of drugs [which caused seventeen thousand deaths] (17 000).

#### Prefer:

#### My impact identifies preventable deaths, so the CP solves for the biggest impact since other impacts are not preventable anyways.

#### My impacts are specific to drug users, so while they might still solve some drug use, my advocacy is specific to the biggest impacts.

## CARTELS SOLVENCY

#### Focused deterrence solves Mexican cartels by halting trafficking operations.

Brown 13 [Vanda Felbab-Brown February 2013. [“Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities” Modernising Drug Law Enforcement. International Drug Policy Consortium, Feb 2013] AT

One of the latest innovations in law enforcement focused deterrence strategies is to internationalise them. Proposed by Mark Kleiman in ‘Surgical strikes in the drug wars’, the concept calls for countries with capacious law enforcement capacity to disrupt the most violent transnational criminal networks in order to help reduce criminal violence in other countries where law enforcement capacity is weak and lacks deterrence capacity.17 Kleiman specifically applied the idea to the U.S.-Mexico context, suggesting that the Mexican government should designate the most pernicious Mexican drug trafficking group, i.e., the most violent one, and the United States law enforcement agencies should strike at, and disrupt, its activities on U.S. territory where the Mexican DTO is believed to be engaged in extensive drug trafficking and distribution operations. Since the U.S. drug market is so lucrative, being eliminated from the U.S. drug market would be exceedingly painful for the designated group; and other Mexican criminal groups would then have strong incentives to moderate their behaviour and reduce violence in order not to draw much attention from U.S. law enforcement agencies and preserve their access to the U.S. drug market. For such a transnational strategy to be effective, the punishment abroad needs to be costly to the criminal group – namely, the disruption of illicit activity abroad needs to generate either large financial losses or critical weakening of its logistical channels (if India, for example, decided to help Mexico by disrupting the operations of Mexican DTOs in India, the impact could be negligible because the penetration of Mexican DTOs into Indian criminal markets is minimal).

# \*\*THEORY\*\*

## PRE-EMPTS

## PICS GOOD SHELL

## A2 TOPIC EDUCATION

## A2 SKEWS AFF OFFENSE

## A2 UNPREDICTABLE

# \*\*EXTRA CARDS\*\*

#### Deterrence fits corporate crime

R. V. G. Clarke, Marcus Felson. [“Routine Activity and Rational Choice” pg 42 Advances in Criminological theory Vol 5]

There are many reasons to believe that a traditional model of deterrence should be helpful in understanding corporate crime. It has been argued that white-collar (and especially corporate)’ offenders are less committed to offending than conventional criminals (Chambliss 1967). Further, in their business and personal lives, managers are risk-averse, “unwilling to engage in activity that poses even minimal threats to the future of the corporation or their own position in it” (Schlegel l990:l6). Therefore, formal sanctions such as fines or incarceration provide a meaningful threat to potential corporate offenders. Another argument for the deterrability of corporate crime is the nature of the offense. [Second,] Corporate crimes are instrumental and strategic. Typical crimes are described as “calculated and deliberative and directed to economic gain” (Kadish l977:30$). They are “almost [and] never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or emotional, but [They are] calculated risks taken by rational actors” (Braithwaite and Geis 1982:302). Accordingly, these offenses are presumed to be more amenable to a cost-beneﬁt calculus on the part of the perpetrator (Chambliss 1967; Braithwaite and Geis 1982). The utilitarian calculus assumed by the deterrence model, in which threats are weighed against potential gains, seems particularly ideal for these offend- ers and circumstances.

#### Kingpins are key to cartels

Brian Palmer 2012. [“How Important Is a Good Kingpin to a Drug Cartel?” Slate.com, Oct. 10, 2012] AT

Mexican forces confirmed the killing of Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, leader of the Zetas drug cartel, on Tuesday. The operation was part of Mexican president Felipe Calderon’s “kingpin strategy” to undermine drug cartels by wiping out the top bosses. How important is a good kingpin to the operation of a cartel? [is] Critically important. Many people liken drug kingpins to corporate CEOs, and there’s something to the analogy. Cartel bosses manage the organization’s talent, promoting plaza bosses who hit their revenue targets while demoting those who fail. They also need to [and] spot business opportunities, like diverting oil from Mexico’s state-owned pipeline with equipment stolen from Texas. The CEO comparison, however, misses an important point. A drug kingpin doesn’t keep his organization together with an innovative business vision or an eye for synergies—he has to scare[s] the bejeezus out of people. Drug trafficking organizations aren’t like corporations, which seek stability and predictability. Warring internal factions, neighboring crime groups, and the government keep cartels in a constant state of crisis, and terror is the successful kingpin’s stock in trade. A good kingpin is far more important to a cartel than a qualified CEO is to a legitimate business.

#### Even if it won’t work alone, focused deterrence is effective coupled with rehabilitation – only the CP can solve the problem of cartels.

Tony Payan 2012 [“The kingpin strategy: A piece of a much larger puzzle” 10/29/2012 Baker Institute] AT

Earlier this month, the Mexican navy announced the death of Heriberto Lazcano, the leader of Mexico’s violent Zetas drug cartel, during a firefight with the marines. The slaying was hailed as a significant victory for the government of President Felipe Calderón, which has made the elimination of top cartel leaders a priority in its fight against organized crime. But will a strategy to target drug kingpins pay off in the long-term? Baker Institute fellows weigh the pros and cons of the approach in a five-day installment of the Baker Institute Viewpoints series. Today, Tony Payan, visiting Baker Institute Scholar for Immigration and Border Studies, writes that the kingpin approach is just one component of a larger strategy to combat drug trafficking. Intelligence services in Mexico and the U.S. have identified a number of important drug trafficking leaders and placed them on a “Most Wanted” list. Many of the tactical efforts of the so-called war on drugs in Mexico have focused on these leaders. The administration of President Felipe Calderón now boasts it has captured or killed nearly two-thirds of these most wanted criminals. This is one of the touted successes of the drug war that some claim has cost nearly 100,000 lives in Mexico alone. The question is whether targeting drug trafficking leaders is an effective strategy in the overall drug war. The answer is yes, but the so-called kingpin strategy cannot by itself end the drug war. It is but one component of a complex strategy to combat illegal drugs. At a superficial level, it is important for the Mexican government to go after these criminals, if only for the sake of its own struggle to establish the rule of law vis-à-vis these powerful characters who challenge the very political and judicial system within Mexico. The kingpin strategy [It] does take away brainpower, experience, skill, and organizational leadership from the drug cartels. Going after cartel leaders does hurt the cartels and often weakens them. However, as it is now evident in Mexico and Colombia, the kingpin strategy can only go so far. From Mexico, we have learned that lieutenants — including family members — are often groomed to take over the business; new leaders always emerge; and kingpin strategies cost many lives because cartel members often vie for power within the group, sometimes producing dozens of gruesome scenes while the cartel readjusts to new leadership. From Colombia, we have learned that even if all the major drug lords are gone, drugs are still being produced, trafficked and marketed as successfully as before. Colombia, for example, continues to be one of the largest producers of cocaine; its cocaine exports to the United States have not flagged, even after its famed cartels from the 1980s were dismantled and formed smaller bands, and the country was left with few prominent drug lords like Pablo Escobar. The American cocaine market has barely suffered due to the absence of Colombian cocaine kingpins. The target-the-leadership strategy has been used very skillfully to fight terrorism. It has worked well in dismantling important Al Qaeda cells. But the illegal drug market is not like the world of terrorism. The objectives of these organizations are different: Al Qaeda has a political purpose; drug lords have a profit motive. Similarly, Al Qaeda is mostly concentrated outside the United States and is able to target American interests abroad. The market for illegal drugs is intertwined with black markets in many U.S. cities and rural areas. Al Qaeda is increasingly isolated in cells that can be identified and targeted; the drug cartels are embedded in society at large and are often neighbors, friends and even family. Thus, unlike the world of terrorism, where the strategy of targeting the leadership may work well, the drug war cannot be understood without taking into account the entire chain and market structure of illegal drugs, and the “pull” (demand for drugs) role that America plays in the chain. The kingpin strategy thus cannot be but one part of the overall strategy in dealing with the use of psychotropic substances. Without addressing drug policy as a whole in the United States, the drug war will continue, no matter how many kingpins the U.S. and Mexican governments eliminate. Drugs will continue to flow, become cheaper, vary in quality regardless of law enforcement efforts, and continue to be consumed by millions of Americans (and Latin Americans). What is required is an approach that addresses the role of illegal drugs in our society. We need honest and open debate on prohibition, and how we can move to harm-reduction strategies by legalizing some drugs, focusing some resources on the most dangerous and pernicious of them, and spending most of our resources on education, prevention and treatment. Finally, a curious fact — one that many Mexicans often complain about — is that the most-wanted list does not include high profile American drug leaders in the largest drug market, the United States. The main question that emerges in conversations in Mexico is whether there are no kingpins in the United States that need to be added to the list — especially when considering the entire chain, from inputs to manufacture or cultivation to distribution to dealing. This is a fair question, as the drug war is fundamentally an American policy being fought on foreign soil, from Mexico to Central America to South America.